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Capitalism and War 
  
The recent flurry of wars – from Afghanistan and Iraq to Gaza and Lebanon – has 
revived talk of Imperialism, Military Keynesianism and the Military-Industrial Com-
plex. Capitalism, many radicals have long argued, needs war. It needs it to expand 
its geographical reach; it needs it to open up new markets; it needs it to access cheap 
raw materials; and it needs it to placate opposition at home and pacify rebellious 
populations abroad.1
The common perception is that war serves to boost the economy. According to 
this argument, military conflict – and high military spending in preparation for such 
conflict – generates overall growth and helps reduce unemployment. This feature of 
military spending turns it into an effective fiscal tool. In years of slack, the govern-
ment can embark on Military Keynesianism, increase its spending on weapons and 
pull the economy out of recession.  
Over the longer haul, military expenditures are said to undermine the peaceful, 
civilian outlook of liberal regimes. Spending on the military boosts the business in-
terests of the large armament corporations, hardens the outlook of the security appa-
ratus and emboldens the top army brass. Together, these groups become increasingly 
fused in an invisible, yet powerful, Military-Industrial Complex – a complex that 
gradually comes to dominates policy and pushes society toward foreign aggression 
and military adventurism. 
 
The Rise and Demise of Military Keynesianism 
 
Theories of Military Keynesianism and the Military-Industrial Complex became 
popular after the Second World War, and perhaps for a good reason. The prospect of 
military demobilization, particularly in the United States, seemed alarming. The 
U.S. elite remembered vividly how soaring military spending had pulled the world 
out of the Great Depression, and it feared that falling military budgets would reverse 
this process. If that were to happen, the expectation was that business would tumble, 
                                                 
1 Not all radical thinkers share this view. Some argue, to the contrary, that war and militariza-
tion, although embedded in and often caused by the capitalist reality, are harmful to capitalism 
and undermine its vitality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NITZAN AND BICHLER: Cheap Wars 
1. U.S. Military Spending and Economic Growth
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unemployment would soar, and the legitimacy of free-market capitalism would again 
be called into question.  
Seeking to avert this prospect, in 1950 the U.S. National Security Council 
drafted a top-secret document, NSC-68. The document, which was declassified only 
in 1977, explicitly called on the government to use higher military spending as a way 
of preventing such an outcome. 2  
NSC-68 marked the birth of Military Keynesianism. In the decades that fol-
lowed, military expenditures seem to have worked as the document envisaged. The 
basic process is illustrated in Figure 1. The graph shows the relationship between 
U.S. economic growth and the country’s military spending. The thin line plots the 
                                                 
2 United States, National Security Council, NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for 
National Security. A Report to the President Pursuant to the President’s Directive of January 31, 1950. 
Top Secret. Washington DC, 1950.  
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NITZAN AND BICHLER: Cheap Wars 
annual rate of economic growth against the right scale. The thick line shows the level 
of military spending, expressed as a share of GDP and plotted against the logarith-
mic left scale.3 Both series are smoothed as 10-year moving averages to emphasize 
their long term tendencies.  
The data show a co-movement of the two series, particularly since the 1930s. 
The rise in military spending in preparation for the Second World War coincided 
with a massive economic boom. Military spending had risen to 43 percent of GDP 
by 1944 and averaged 20 percent of GDP during the 1940s. This rise was accompa-
nied by soaring economic growth, with annual rates peaking at 18 percent in 1942 
and averaging 6 percent during the 1940s (the peak levels of the early 1940s cannot 
be seen in the chart due to the smoothing of the series).  
After the war, military spending began to trend downward, but remained at very 
high levels for the next couple of decades. The adoption of Military Keynesianism, 
along with the wars in Korea and Vietnam, helped keep military expenditures at 12 
percent of GDP during the 1950s and at 10 percent during the 1960s. Economic 
growth during this period averaged over 4 percent – lower than in the Second World 
War, but rapid enough to sustain the buoyancy of American capitalism and the con-
fidence of its capitalists. 
Both big business and organized labor supported this set up. The large corporate 
groups saw military spending as an acceptable and even desirable form of govern-
ment intervention. At the aggregate level, these expenditures helped counteract the 
threat of recession at home and offset the loss of civilian markets to European and 
Japanese competitors – yet without undermining the sanctity of private ownership 
and free enterprise. At the disaggregate level, many large firms received lucrative 
contracts from the Pentagon, handouts that even the staunchest free marketers found 
difficult to refuse.  
The large unions endorsed Military Keynesianism for different reasons. They 
agreed to stay out of domestic politics and international relations, to accept high 
military expenditures, and to minimize strikes in order to keep the industrial peace. 
In return, they received job security, high wages and the promise of ever-rising stan-
dards of living.  
The consensus was aptly summarized in 1971 by President Nixon, who pro-
nounced that ‘we are all Keynesians now.’  
But that was the peak. By the early 1970s, the Keynesian Coalition of big busi-
ness and organized labor started to unravel, Military Keynesianism began to wither 
and the welfare-warfare state commenced its long decline.  
 
                                                 
3 A logarithmic scale has the effect of amplifying the size on the chart of smaller values and 
compressing the size of larger ones. This transformation is useful when there are very big 
jumps in the data – such as during the 1940s – jumps that would otherwise make the variations 
of smaller values look too miniscule to discern on the chart. 
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The Globalization of Ownership 
 
Underlying the rise and demise of Military Keynesianism was an epochal reversal in 
the spatial nature of ownership – a U-turn from gradual de-globalization in the first 
half of the century to massive globalization in the second half.  
Until the 1950s, the ownership of capital, in the United States and elsewhere, 
was retreating into its national cocoons. The statistical footprints of the process are 
clear. In 1900, the ratio of foreign-held assets to world GDP reached a peak of 19 
percent. But the subsequent turmoil of two world wars, depression, import substitu-
tion and capital controls have taken a heavy toll. Foreign ownership ties were broken 
or frozen, and the ratio of foreign-held assets to world GDP fell continuously, reach-
ing a mere 6 percent in 1960. At the trough of the process, the accumulation of capi-
tal was conducted largely within national boundaries.  
This decline ended in the early 1970s. Capital again broke through its national 
envelope, and as neoliberalism and deregulation gained momentum foreign owner-
ship started to rise. The ratio of foreign-held assets to world GDP increased exponen-
tially, doubling every decade: it rose to 25 percent in 1980, climbed to 50 percent in 
1990, and reached over 90 percent by 2000.4  
The effect on profit of this reversal has been dramatic. U.S.-based firms now re-
ceive roughly one third of their earnings from their foreign subsidiaries, up from 5 
percent in the 1950s – a six-fold increase. 
This reversal in the global pattern of ownership fundamentally altered the power 
structure and institutions of capitalism. With capital bought and sold on a world 
scale and profits increasingly earned outside the country, capital accumulation be-
came less and less reliant on domestic sales. With less emphasis on local activity, 
Keynesian policies grew out of fashion. And with Keynesianism on the decline, the 
business-labor accord started to unravel.  
The welfare state, previously seen as a bulwark against communism, became a 
burden. Labor was no longer likely to revolt – particularly with jobs being shipped to 
‘emerging markets’ and with union membership on the decline. Furthermore, capi-
talists were no longer fearful of recession. On the contrary, they often encouraged it 
as a means of disciplining workers, reducing wages and reversing the hard-won so-
cial gains of working people.  
The warfare state was also coming under pressure. The turning point was the 
collapse of Soviet Bloc. With only one superpower remaining, large military budgets 
were now difficult to justify. In the 1990s, military spending around the world took a 
nose dive, falling by as much as 1/3rd from their all time peak in the late 1980s. As 
Figure 1 shows, expenditures on armaments in the United States, the world’s largest 
                                                 
4 Data on the ratio of foreign assets to GDP are from Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, 
Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis and Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), pp. 52-53, Table 2-1. 
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spender, dropped to an average of 4.5 percent of GDP in the first half of the 2000s, 
down from 7 percent in the 1980s.  
 
The New Wars 
 
The demise of the welfare-warfare state opened the door for the new rhetoric of neo-
liberalism. Proponents of free markets hailed the new regime for its peaceful tenden-
cies. Its detractors agreed – but only partly. On the one hand, they concurred that 
neoliberalism, in its quest to secure free trade and open capital flow, tries to establish 
political stability and international peace. On the other hand, they faulted neoliberal-
ism for its invisible violence, inflicted through hyper exploitation, mass poverty, ris-
ing inequality, economic uncertainty and human insecurity.  
Both the adherents and the critics, therefore, were surprised by the sudden belli-
cosity of the early twenty-first century. Old theories of imperialism and militarism 
were quickly dusted off and tucked onto neoliberalism. Instead of productivity mira-
cles and No Logo, analysts started to talk about ‘new imperialism’ and ‘neoliberal 
wars.’ 
For the most part, though, these hybrid theories are misleading. The new con-
flicts of the twenty-first century – the ‘infinite wars,’ the ‘clashes of civilization,’ the 
‘new crusades’ – are fundamentally different from the ‘mass wars’ and statist military 
conflicts that characterized capitalism from the nineteenth century until the end of 
the Cold War. The main difference lies not so much in the military nature of the con-
flicts, as in the broader role that war plays in capitalism.  
To begin with, in a world open for business there is no need to physically con-
quer new territory – not for raw materials and not for additional markets (note that 
Iraqi oil production has nearly ceased since its conquest in 2003, while its market for 
foreign imports, negligible to begin with, has contracted).  
The same goes for military spending: with the share of foreign profits soaring, 
there is no longer a business imperative for high military expenditures. While U.S. 
military budgets have risen marginally in the wake of the new wars – from 3.9 per-
cent of GDP at the end of Clinton’s presidency to 4.7 percent presently – this is an 
increase whose effect on aggregate demand is insignificant by historical standards.  
The U.S. attacks of the 2000s also make little military sense. Countries with 
proven nuclear capabilities, such as Pakistan and North Korea, have been left alone, 
while others that presented no real danger – specifically Afghanistan and Iraq – were 
invaded, occupied and now tie down much of the U.S. standing army, with no end 
in sight.  
Finally, the televised war footing and constant talk about terrorism may have 
frightened the western population. But unlike the success of nationalist-liberal ide-
ologies during the two world wars and the Cold War that followed, the new rhetoric 
of infinite war hasn’t made the masses fall for neoliberal capitalism. 
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The wars of the 2000s are indeed new. And they are new, at least in part, be-
cause capitalism itself has changed.  
 
The New Order of Capital 
 
The central change concerns the underlying nature of capital, a transformation that 
began in the late nineteenth century but became evident only recently.  
Existing theories, anchored in the reality of the early nineteenth century, con-
tinue to examine capital from the ‘material’ perspective of consumption and produc-
tion. Neoclassical economists anchor their analysis in utility, while classical Marxists 
base it on labor time. In contrast to these approaches, we suggest that, under modern 
conditions, capital can no longer be viewed as a ‘material’ entity. As we see it, capi-
tal represents neither neoclassical utility nor Marxist abstract labor, but rather power 
– the power of its owners to shape the process of social reproduction as a whole.  
Based on a power understanding of capital, we argue, first, that the analysis of 
capitalism should focus not on capital ‘in general’ and many capitals ‘in competi-
tion,’ but specifically on the dominant capital groups at the centre of the political 
economy. Second, we claim that accumulation should be understood not absolutely, 
but differentially – that is, in reference to the ability of dominant capital to ‘beat the 
average’ and increase its relative power.5
The implications of this power perspective are far reaching. For our purpose 
here, they suggest:  
 
1. That over time, corporate mergers, rather than economic growth, become the 
main engine of differential accumulation (‘breadth’); and  
 
2. That under certain circumstances, dominant capital can benefit greatly from in-
flation and stagflation (‘depth’). 
 
In our research we found that, over the past century, global accumulation indeed 
oscillated between these two regimes of merger and stagflation. The most recent 
phase, which lasted through much of the late 1980s and 1990s, was clearly one of 
breadth. In that period, dominant capital benefited greatly from the opening up to 
corporate takeover of the former Soviet Union and other ‘emerging markets,’ as well 
as from the collapse of the welfare state and the massive privatization of government 
services.  
This breadth cycle, with its emphasis on neoliberalism, deregulation, sound fi-
nance and disinflation, came to a close at the turn of the new millennium. The finan-
cial crisis that began in Asia and later spread to the core markets, the crumbling of 
                                                 
5 These issues are articulated in Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘Dominant Capital 
and the New Wars,’ Journal of World Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 255-327. 
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the ‘new economy’ and its scandalous accounting practices, and talk of global terror-
ism and the infinite war to defeat it, have together made capital movement look less 
tempting and mergers far less promising. Furthermore, two decades of neoliberalism 
have weakened pricing power, raising the specter of price and debt deflation for the 
first time since the Great Depression. 
Faced with these predicaments, capitalists generally and dominant capitalists 
particularly began yearning for a little dose of ‘healthy’ inflation both to avert debt 
deflation and to kick-start differential accumulation. As it turned out, the solution for 
their predicament – intended or otherwise – was a new ‘Energy Conflict’ in the Middle 
East (that is, a conflict related directly or indirectly to oil). Over the past thirty-five 
years, these conflicts have been the prime mover of oil prices, and oil prices have 
provided the spark for broad-based inflation. It was a turnkey mechanism for trigger-
ing inflation, and it was read to use.  
In this sense, military conflict has come to assume a new, roundabout role in the 
accumulation process. Until the 1950s and 1960s, the main impact of military con-
flict worked through large military budgets which directly boosted aggregate demand 
and overall profits, as well as the income of the leading military contractors. But with 
the re-globalization of ownership and the on-setting of détente, military budgets 
started to contract. Initially, they fell relatively, as a share of GDP, but since the late 
1980s, they also began to drop absolutely, in constant dollar terms. Although these 
expenditures still nourish the military contractors, their direct effect on capital accu-
mulation has diminished significantly.  
However, military conflict as such hasn’t lost its appeal; it still has a big impact 
on accumulation. The novelty is that the impact now works mostly indirectly, through 
inflation, relative prices and redistribution.  
  
Energy Conflicts and Differential Profits 
 
The key beneficiaries of this new, indirect link are the large oil companies. The geo-
graphic centre of this process is the Middle East. After the Vietnam War, the Middle 
East has become the hot spot of global conflict, with obvious corollaries for the price 
of oil. The relationship between these conflicts and the differential profits of the oil 
companies, however, has received little or no attention.  
The reason for this neglect is not difficult to see. Most analyses of Middle-East 
conflict and oil are situated in the disciplinary intersection of ‘international relations’ 
and ‘international economics.’ Their basic reasoning boils down to a statist struggle 
over raw materials. On the one hand, there are the industrialized countries that need 
cheap oil in order to sustain their growth and expanded reproduction. On the other 
hand there are the countries of the Middle East, organized through OPEC, whose 
intention is to extract from the process as much rent as they can. This broad conflict 
is complicated by various factors: for example, inter-state rivalry – say between the 
United States and the Soviet Union (previously) and Europe and Asia (presently); 
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2. Leading Oil Companies: Differential Profits
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religious and ethnic hostilities in the Middle East itself; or the interests of various 
sectors and capitalist fractions in the industrialized countries.  
In this polemic of high politics and resource economics, few have bothered to 
break through the aggregate front, fewer have done empirical work, and almost no 
one has dealt with the question of how exactly accumulation by the oil companies 
fits into the picture. Figure 2 offers a glimpse into what is missing from the story. The 
chart shows the history of differential accumulation by the ‘Petro-Core’ of leading oil 
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companies – specifically, BP, Chevron, Exxon, Mobil, Royal-Dutch/Shell and Tex-
aco.6  
Each bar in the figure measures the difference between the rate of return on eq-
uity of these companies and the average rate of return on equity of the Fortune 500 
benchmark (with the result expressed as a percent of the Fortune 500 average). The 
grey bars show years of differential accumulation; that is, years in which the leading 
oil companies beat the average with a higher rate of return. The black bars show pe-
riods of differential decumulation; that is, years in which the leading oil companies 
trailed the average. For reasons that will become apparent in a moment, these latter 
periods signal ‘danger’ in the Middle East. Finally, the explosion signs show ‘Energy 
Conflicts’ – namely, conflicts that were related, directly or indirectly, to oil.7 The 
figure exhibits three related patterns, all remarkable in their persistence:  
 
x First, every energy conflict in the Middle East was preceded by a danger zone, in 
which the oil companies suffered differential decumulation. 
 
x Second, every energy conflict was followed by a period during which the oil 
companies beat the average. 
 
x And, third, with only one exception in 1996-7, the oil companies never managed 
to beat the average without an Energy Conflict first taking place.8 
 
Furthermore, this pattern fits into the larger processes of breadth and depth. The 
figure points to three distinct periods, each characterized by a different regime of dif-
ferential accumulation, and each led by a different faction within dominant capital. 
During the depth era of the 1970s and early 1980s, differential accumulation was 
fuelled by stagflation and driven by conflict. The leading faction within dominant 
capital was the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition of large armament and oil firms. 
In this context, the oil companies managed to beat the average comfortably, with 
only occasional setbacks which were quickly corrected by Middle East conflicts.  
During the breadth period of the late 1980s and 1990s, merger replaced inflation 
as the main engine of differential accumulation. The oil and armament companies 
                                                 
6 Due to mergers, the data in Figure 2 pertain to British Petroleum until 1997 and to BP-
Amoco since 1998; to Chevron and Texaco until 1999 and to Chevron-Texaco since 2000; to 
Exxon and Mobil until 1998 and to ExxonMobil from 1999; and to Royal-Dutch/Shell 
throughout. 
7 The conflicts include the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict; the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict; the 1979 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon; the 1979 Iranian Revolution; the 1979 Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan; the 1980 beginning of the Iraq-Iran War; the 1990/1 first Gulf War; the 2000 be-
ginning of the second Intifada; the 2001 Coalition invasion of Afghanistan; and the 2003 Coali-
tion invasion of Iraq (whose publicized preparation began in 2002). 
8 Although there was no ‘official’ conflict in 1996-7, there was plenty of violence, including an 
Iraqi invasion of Kurdish areas and U.S. cruise missile attacks. 
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lost their primacy to a ‘new economy’ coalition led by civilian high-tech companies. 
Neoliberal rhetoric replaced the lingo of welfare-warfare state, conflicts in the Middle 
East grew fewer and farther between, and the oil companies commonly trailed the 
average.  
Events over the past few years suggest that this second period may have come to 
an end, with the ebbing of the merger boom and the return to primacy of the 
Weaponodollar-Petrodollar Coalition. The latter coalition, whose fortunes had dwin-
dled since the stagflationary bonanza of the 1970s and early 1980s, has come back 
with a vengeance. Having helped re-install the Bush family in the White House, the 
coalition started looking for new enemies and was only too happy to exploit the 
opportunity offered by the ‘new Pearl Harbor’ of September 11.9
The argument and statistical patterns presented here were first articulated in the 
late 1980s, further developed in the mid-1990s, and most recently updated in 2006.10 
However, the last few observations in Figure 2 are new, and they suggest a quantita-
tive departure from past patterns. Until the late 1990s, the differential performance of 
the oil companies oscillated between 50 percent above or below the Fortune 500. 
Recently, though, the scale changed. During the period of 2000-2005, the world’s 
                                                 
9 In 2003, as the Iraq war unfolded, we wrote the following text:  
 
Our own view is that Middle East conflicts were integral to the power processes of 
global accumulation. . . . In the process, [the Weapondollar-Petrodollar] coalition 
had become increasingly fused with its ‘parent’ governments on the one hand and its 
OPEC ‘hosts’ on the other, leading to a growing ‘capital-state symbiosis’ between 
them. Whether or not there was ‘conspiracy’ here, and what the precise nature of 
such a ‘conspiracy’ was, remains an open question. Unfortunately, these types of is-
sues are not the usual staple of primetime television. Occasionally, however, the 
truth does come to light, albeit with a little delay. . . . Perhaps in due course someone 
will publish the secret ‘Exxon Papers’ or a declassified ‘NSC Report on Energy and 
War in the Middle East,’ thereby opening a window into the backroom story of En-
ergy Conflicts in the region (‘Dominant Capital and the New Wars,’ Journal of World 
Systems Research, 2004, Vol. 10, No. 2, p. 313).  
 
As it turned out, the relevant documents surfaced rather quickly. Less than a year after the 
publication of our paper, Greg Palast uncovered the existence of two secret – and rather differ-
ent – plans for the future of Iraq’s oil. The 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, Palast argued, reflected 
the conflicting strategies of two opposing factions. The first, vocal faction, led by the neo-cons 
and the Pentagon, planned to privatize Iraqi oil, flood the market and undermine OPEC. The 
other faction, led by the large oil companies and elements within the State Department, shared 
none of these fantasies. It let the neo-cons finish the job of conquering Iraq, and then sent its 
representatives to take control of the country’s oil production. In the end, there was no privati-
zation, no flooding of the market and no undermining of OPEC – an organization of which 
the United States, as the ruler of Iraq, was now a de-facto member. See Greg Palast, ‘Secret 
US Plans for Iraq’s Oil,’ BBC News, March 17, 2005; Greg Palast, Armed Madhouse (New York: 
Dutton, 2006). 
10 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘New Imperialism or New Capitalism?’ Review, 
2006, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, pp. 1-86.  
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four leading oil companies earned $338 billion in net profit – one third of a trillion – 
representing an average rate of return of 20 percent, nearly twice the Fortune 500’s.  
 
The Primacy of Prices 
 
The link that connects Middle-East conflicts and differential profitability is the price 
of oil. This link is illustrated in Figure 3. The thick line in the chart shows the percent 
share of all listed oil companies in global corporate profit. The thin line shows the 
‘relative’ price of crude oil, computed by dividing the dollar price per barrel by the 
U.S. consumer price index, and lagged one year (reported corporate earnings repre-
sent the moving sum of the past four quarters; the full impact on profit of a change in 
the price of oil therefore is felt only after a year ). 
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The correlation between the two series is extremely tight.11 This statistical fact 
points to the immense importance that prices have come to play in the process of 
accumulation. In this particular chart, the tight correlation makes much of the media 
discussion and learned analyses of the oil arena redundant. In order to know the re-
ported differential profits of the oil companies a year from now, you don’t need to 
speculate about Peak Oil, about rising demand from China, or about the coming heat 
waves in Europe. This type of guesswork, although interesting for other purposes, is 
unnecessary here. The only thing you need to know is the current price of oil.  
To illustrate: the official data are not yet in, but we already know that, over the 
past 12 months, the price of oil averaged roughly $65 in 2002 dollars. The correlation 
in the chart suggests that, a year from now, the reported global profit share of the oil 
companies will hover around 15 percent.  
Now, let’s backtrack and examine the history presented in Figure 3. The data 
show that, during the oil crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s, the cost of crude petro-
leum shot through the roof. In 1979 a barrel of oil cost over $90 in today’s prices. 
During those happy stagflationary times, the oil companies pocketed nearly 20 per-
cent of all global profits. But as differential accumulation moved into breadth and 
mergers picked up, inflation fell and oil prices dropped even faster. The oil compa-
nies’ global share of profit collapsed, reaching a mere 3 percent by the end of Clin-
ton’s presidency. 
The reversal came with the new millennium and the Bush presidency. With the 
2001 invasion of Afghanistan, the Middle East entered a protracted period of war, oil 
prices have risen to $65-75, and the share of the oil companies in global profit – al-
though not yet at historical highs – is moving higher and higher. 
How big are the gains of the oil companies? During the five-year period from 
August 2001 to July 2006, the average net income of the global oil sector amounted 
to $108 billion per annum. This figure compares with an annual profit of only $34 
billion in the year from August 1999 to July 2000 – a jump of $75 billion if we round 
the numbers. 
How much did it cost to generate this jump in profits? For argument’s sake, let’s 
assume that since 2000 the entire increase in the price of oil – and therefore the 
whole increase in oil profits – was due to the new Energy Conflicts in the Middle 
East. Assume further that so far the U.S. government has spent on its Afghanistan-
Iraq operation the annual equivalent of 1 percent of its GDP – roughly $100 billion a 
year.  
These assumptions, although simplistic and inaccurate, indicate the overall 
magnitudes involved: the war costs $100 billion a year and it generates an extra $75 
billion in annual oil profits. In other words, for every $1 the U.S. government spends 
on the wars, the owners of the oil companies earn an additional ¢75 in net profit. 
                                                 
11 The correlation coefficient between the two monthly series measures 0.80 (out of 1) for the 
period since January 1974, and 0.92 for the period since January 1979. 
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Clearly, such phenomenal cost-benefit ratios can be generated only indirectly. 
And that is perhaps one of the important features of the new wars: a fairly modest 
increase in military spending brings about massive changes in prices and distribution 
– changes that go beyond the immediate arena of the conflict, and whose magnitude 
can match and even exceed the military budget itself. 
 
Sweet Inflation 
 
As noted earlier, the new wars came as the long breadth phase of differential accu-
mulation was winding down. The immediate beneficiaries were the arms contractors 
and the oil companies of the Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition. But gradually, as 
global differential accumulation shifted from breadth to depth, the gains spread to 
dominant capital as a whole. 
Figure 4 vividly illustrates this process for the United States. The thin line in the 
graph plots the rate of inflation, measured as the annual rate of change of the con-
sumer price index. The thick line is a ratio between profits and wages. It measures 
the ratio of the earnings per share of the S&P 500 (the largest publicly traded corpo-
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rations listed in the United States, which could be taken as a proxy for dominant 
capital) to the hourly wage rate in manufacturing.  
Movements in this latter ratio indicate redistribution. When the index rises, it 
means that the profits of dominant capital rise faster (or fall more slowly) than the 
wage rate. When the index falls it suggests an opposite process – namely, that the 
profits of dominant capital fall faster (or rise more slowly) than wages.  
As the chart shows, in late 2000, inflation started falling, and in 2002 it reached 
1 percent – a postwar low. The decline was accompanied by a massive drop in the 
ratio of profit to wages, which fell by 55 percent from its 2000 peak. In the wake of 
these developments, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman, Alan Greenspan, warned 
of an ‘unwelcome substantial fall in inflation,’ and was encouraged by leading finan-
ciers to ‘go for higher inflation.’12
These deflationary warnings came in April 2003, after the U.S. had already in-
vaded Iraq. Our own view at the time was rather different. In January 2003, just be-
fore the invasion, we wrote: 
 
. . . if oil prices continue to rise, inflation will most likely follow, the spectre 
of deflation will be removed and the large companies could sound a big sigh 
of relief. For these companies there would also be an icing on the cake. In-
flation usually works to redistribute income from labour to capital and from 
small firms to larger ones. It will therefore make the leading companies bet-
ter off relatively, if not absolutely.13  
 
And indeed, Greenspan didn’t have to work too hard. The new wars have done 
the job for him. The neo-conservatives sent their army to the Middle East, the price 
of oil soared, and inflation – although hesitant at first – eventually started to follow.  
The distributional consequences weren’t lost on investors and workers. While 
wages remained flat, profits – particularly those earned by dominant capital – surged. 
As a result, the ratio of profit to wages climbed rapidly – rising 250 percent since 
2001 and sending the overall share of profit in GDP to its highest level since data 
began to be collated in 1929.  
The huge distributional impact of a small increase in inflation is symptomatic of 
the new order. During the welfare-warfare state, inflation usually involved a wage-
price spiral that worked to limit the differential increases in profits. For instance, a 4 
percent increase in prices typically would be accompanied by a rise in wages – say, of 
3 percent. A result, the markup ratio of sales to wages would increase by 1 percent, 
generating a relatively modest rise in profits. The situation now is very different. 
                                                 
12 Alan Greenspan, ‘Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Before the Joint Economic 
Committee,’ U.S. Congress, May 6, 2003; Bill Dudley and Paul McCulley, ‘Greenspan Must 
Go For Higher Inflation,’ Financial Times, April 23, 2003, pp. 17. 
13 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, ‘It's All About Oil,’ News From Within, Vol. XIX, 
No. 1, January 2003, p. 11.  
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Workers in the United Stares are locked in global competition with workers in 
China, India and other ‘emerging markets,’ which means that wages do not rise – 
and sometimes even fall – in the midst of price inflation. In this context, a 4 percent 
inflation translates to a 4 percent increase in the markup and to a far larger increase 
in profits.  
All in all, then, the new wars are definitely cheap. For a minimal cost, they stir 
up inflation and generate large increases in profits. But cheap wars have another side 
to them. They are hard to win.  
 
Cheap Wars 
 
The idea of a mass, ‘voluntary’ army was born out of the French Revolution. The new 
soldiers turned out to be cheaper and more loyal than mercenaries, and they fought 
well. However, the masses needed to be educated so that they could read the newspa-
pers and follow the propaganda – hence the birth of compulsory ‘elementary’ school-
ing. Later on, the proles started to demand additional perks. They wanted culture, in-
surance, pensions and veteran benefits. In the 1910s, the elites cheated them. They sent 
the masses to be butchered by the millions in the trenches of World War I, and then 
abandoned those who returned as veterans. This experience raised the ante. In the 
early 1940s, the citizens-soldiers had to be offered a whole welfare state, so that they 
would be willing to get butchered, again, in the Second World War. What initially 
looked like ‘soldiers for free’ turned out to be a rather expensive way of fighting wars.  
The last expensive war was Vietnam. With neoliberal globalization replacing the 
welfare-warfare state, there was no longer a need for mass armies with high overhead. 
Instead, the capitalists started to invest in ‘smart weapons’ that could be operated by 
high-school dropouts and cause plenty of damage. They abandoned the draft in favor 
of purely professional armies – partly governmental, partly private. 
A similar process has taken place in Israel. During the 1970s, in the hay days of 
the Israeli welfare-warfare economy, military spending amounted to 25 percent of 
GDP, the draft included most Jewish citizens (excluding the ultra-orthodox), and the 
government spent heavily on social services.  
But with the breadth regime of the late 1980s and 1990s, Israeli capitalists became 
decreasingly dependent on the war economy. Israel began its reconciliation with its 
neighboring Arab states, and the military was both reduced and transformed. Military 
spending dropped to 6 percent of GDP, and many military activities were privatized. 
The duration of military service has been shortened, and fewer get drafted. In parallel, 
the welfare state has been progressively dismantled, with education, public health care 
and other social services consistently eroding. Hundreds of thousands of guest workers 
have been brought in, and the labor unions have been reduced to token institutions.  
The consequences of this process are illustrated in Figure 5. The chart contrasts the 
average monthly wage rate with the Tel-Aviv stock price index (both expressed in con-
stant prices and rebased for comparison purposes, with January 1980=100).  
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The figure shows that, until the early 1990s, the fortunes of workers and capital-
ists moved more or less in tandem. But with the onslaught of the breadth regime, 
their roads parted. During the 1990s and early 2000s, wages have hardly increased, 
while capital gains have risen to the stratosphere.  
Israeli reservists, who are now being called to fight in the unfolding war, proba-
bly have not seen this graph, but the reality behind it is certainly familiar to them. 
They know about deteriorating social services, about job insecurity, about overly 
expensive housing, about the loss of open spaces. They know that getting wounded 
in a war is a bad deal that yields meager compensation. Most importantly, they know 
that the elite that sends them to fight doesn’t really care about them. 
These sentiments are quite explicit and appear regularly in the press. The follow-
ing is a typical report of the difficulties faced by reserve soldiers: 
 
Defense Minister Amir Peretz has refused to use a law allowing IDF reserv-
ists called up for service recently to enjoy an exemption on fines and interest 
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associated with debts they incur during their call-up period. . . . [The reserv-
ists] are furious after discovering they are still required to pay the fines and 
interest even though they were unable to issue payments on time because 
they were called up. . . . ‘The reservists are forgotten, the way they always 
forget us,’ said one of the [reservists organization’s] leaders, Alex 
Minkovsky. ‘We're calling on the social-minded Defense Minister Amir 
Peretz to wake up and do something. We’re flooded by inquiries of reserv-
ists who are suffering crises on a daily basis.’14
 
Dominant capital has no such complaints. As it turns out, a day before Defense 
Minister Peretz refused to heed the reservists’ plea, his government privatized the 
country’s oil refineries for $800 million. In an interview, the winning bidder, Tzadik 
Bino, sounded almost embarrassed: 
 
The state should not have privatized the refineries, and neither should it 
have privatized El-Al [the national airline], Bezeq [the national phone com-
pany] and Magen David Adom [the emergency medical service]. . . . The 
next stage would be to privatize the IDF. . . . We are still fighting for our ex-
istence, and it doesn’t pay to transfer strategic assets to private hands.15  
 
The old warfare-welfare state was dominated by charismatic figure heads, ‘lead-
ers’ such as Churchill, de Gaulle and Ben Gurion who seemed removed from any 
‘particular’ interests. By contrast, the neoliberal state tends to be populated by retain-
ers – many of them corrupt and criminal – like Bush, Chirac, Berlusconi, Sharon, 
Netanyahu and Olmert, who don’t even try to hide their true loyalties.  
The capitalist elite, which is served by and sustains these politicians, no longer 
bears a clear national attachment. Many of Israel’s largest companies are owned by 
foreign investors and multinational companies. Similarly, most of Israel’s large own-
ers – from the Recannatis, to Fishman to Khan – have become global investors. Is-
rael for them is merely one of many assets in a diversified world portfolio. Unlike 
during the 1970s, when they had all their eggs in the same Israeli basket, now they 
don’t need to worry too much about what happens in the country. Their local hold-
ings represent only a fraction of their investments, and they are highly vendible. 
A recent quote from the financial section of the daily Ha’aretz, written in the 
midst of the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza, indicates the extent to which foreign as-
set diversification has been accepted as natural by ‘ordinary’ investors:  
 
Over and above the ‘regular’ risks of emerging markets such as China, Brazil 
or Russia, Israel has a continuous security risk. . . . This risk cannot be ig-
                                                 
14 Tani Goldstein, ‘Reservists Want Peretz to Okay Perks,’ Ynet, August 1, 2006. 
15 Tani Goldstein, ‘Bino to Ynet: "There Was No Need to Privatize the Refineries,”’ Hebrew, 
Ynet, August 1, 2006. 
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nored even in peace time. The global diversification of investment therefore 
is not a privilege. It is a necessity. . . . It means that, in the interest of reduc-
ing risk, Israeli investors have to permanently allocate a fixed proportion of 
their assets to investment overseas. How much is ‘enough’? Until recently, 
the convention was 25%, but perhaps the share of foreign assets should be 
raised to 50%. Our bodies have to stay here. But why should our savings suf-
fer the same fate?16  
 
Under these circumstances, it is little wonder that the Israeli ‘war machine’ has 
lost much of its military edge. The incentive to fight for “one’s country” when that 
country is so socially fractured is much reduced – particularly when confronted with 
socially embedded and highly motivated religious militias.  
And so the cheap wars linger, death and destruction mount, and the profits con-
tinue to accumulate.  
                                                 
16 Ami Ginsburg, ‘What Did We Learn From the First Two Weeks of the Second Lebanon 
War?’ Hebrew, Ha'aretz, July 28, 2006. 
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